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In 2007, the Director of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Tech-nologies received a request to investigate a potentially promising 
heat-treatment process to extend the operational life of humanitarian-
deminer visors through removal of scratches from the field of view. The 
heat-treatment procedure was developed by undergraduate students 
as part of a product-design course and was published in The Journal 
of Mine Action.3 The authors of that article noted that further testing 
would be required to determine whether the visor properties were ad-
versely affected by the scratch-repair procedure. In order to allow for 
Blast Testing of Visors Used for 
Humanitarian Demining  
by Captain Charlene Fawcett [ DRDC Suffield ]
This article discusses experimental results from blast testing of Security Devices Ltd. polycarbonate visors used 
by humanitarian deminers. Visors used in the blast testing fell into one of three categories: new visors, manually 
scratched visors, and scratched and heat-gun-repaired visors. Results show that the visors in all three categories 
failed to meet the draft international standard for blast testing1 relevant at the time, that further research is 
required to establish pressure profiles for the standard charge size being tested, and that the proposed heat- 
treatment method does appear to degrade the blast resistance of the visor used in the test.2 
an independent assessment of the technique, the authors provided a 
detailed outline of the procedure in the article that readers could fol-
low independently. 
Trial Objectives and Methodology
The objective of this research was to assess the blast and ballistic per-
formance of deminer visors before and after heat treatment. To ensure 
compatibility with the original student project, the same type of visors 
were obtained from Security Devices Ltd.
Figure 1: Testing platform and positioning rig.
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so significant considering the 95% confidence 
limit, but devices for demining must avoid the 
POD reduction as much as possible. The re-
sults suggest that the Gryphon can reduce FAR 
more than the ALIS can. However, the abso-
lute level of FARs is almost the same as shown 
in Figure 2 (see page 68) and the larger FAR re-
duction is due to a larger number of false alarms 
given by the metal detector implemented in the 
Gryphon. Therefore, performances of the whole 
system as dual sensor in terms of FAR can be 
characterized as almost the same.
Figure 4 (see page 69) shows probability of 
detections given by the metal detector and by 
both sensors, along with the discrimination 
ratio with respect to depth for each device. 
As the theory in the Das and McFee article12 
states and former trials verified, the PODs giv-
en by the metal detectors are decreasing with 
depth. Since the GPRs are always used after 
the metal detectors, the PODs used by the 
dual sensors cannot exceed those by the met-
al detectors. It can be observed that the PODs 
by both sensors positively correlate with the 
PODs by the metal detectors.
Furthermore, discrimination ratios tend 
to increase with depth in these results. This 
fact cannot be determined conclusively be-
cause the number of mines belonging to each 
depth class is small and the estimation would 
not be sufficiently accurate. This tendency sup-
ports a common theory that GPR has difficul-
ties in detecting shallowly buried targets since 
reflections from the ground surface mask 
those from targets.13 However, this observed 
tendency is not as strong as expected; both 
systems achieved about 0.7 of the discrimina-
tion ratio at the depth range from 0–3cm, so 
the theory cannot clearly be confirmed. This 
may be because both sensors measured data 
of GPR as images in terms of horizontal slice 
and this type of representation may be good at 
depicting small changes close to the surface, 
unlike only one-time signals or a vertical slice.
Conclusions and Discussion
The results of the test campaign for the 
dual-sensor systems tell us that those sys-
tems reduced false-alarm rates significantly by 
more than one-half. However, the systems also 
reduced probability of detections, which must 
be avoided in real clearance operations. Useful-
ness of the dual sensors may strongly depend 
on improvements with POD.
The full report4 stated that the three de-
miners who worked on the ALIS achieved 
different results in terms of POD, FAR and 
working hours. The variation may be caused 
by the way the deminers interpret the output 
of the sensor and make decisions when oper-
ating the ALIS. The visual interpretation of 
images and decision-making process are en-
tirely subject to the operators themselves. In 
order to avoid unstable and/or unexpected re-
sults, further developments/improvements, 
such as an automatic-recognition algorithm, 
are recommended.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to use 
stand-alone metal detectors at the same time 
as a benchmark, making a direct comparison 
of dual sensors to stand-alone metal detectors 
unavailable. However, one can roughly com-
pare the detectors to those from the STEMD 
trial,5 taking into account additional metals. 
The ALIS and the Gryphon needed approxi-
mately five and nine minutes, respectively, to 
survey an average of one square meter. It can 
be roughly estimated that the ALIS may be two 
to three times slower and the Gryphon may 
be four to five times slower than stand-alone 
metal detectors.14 Even if the search speed in 
this test is slower than for a stand-alone met-
al detector, it is possible that these dual sen-
sors would accelerate the clearance operation 
in total, because rejected alarms from metals 
would reduce the need for excavation or could 
be rapidly excavated. Increased search speed 
would also multiply these benefits. 
Another dual-sensor trial in Germany was 
carried out in September 2009 by the Interna-
tional Test and Evaluation Program for Hu-
manitarian Demining and led by the German 
Federal Office of Defense Technology and Pro-
curement.15 The results are being analyzed and 
we hope that a more detailed evaluation of dual-
sensor performance will be available soon. 
The authors acknowledge Mr. N. Pavković 
and Mr. T. V. B. Vondracek from HCR-CTRO 
for managing the test. We also thank the devel-
opers and deminers that participated.
See Endnotes, Page 79
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The visors were placed in three catego-
ries for blast and ballistic assessment: new, 
scratched, and scratched and heat-repaired. 
Following the procedures in the original 
project as closely as possible, a new visor was 
scratched by rubbing sand on the outer surface 
until the visor was opaque, which provided the 
“scratched” condition. To get the “scratched 
and heat-repaired” condition, a new visor was 
scratched as described and then washed and 
dried in an oven. After cooling, it was treated 
using a heat gun in the manner described in 
the students’ original project.3
The following documents were used as 
guidance to develop the test methodologies 
for blast and ballistic assessment: 
•	 “Test Methodologies for Personal 
Protective Equipment Against Anti-
Personnel Mine Blast”4 
•	 European Centre for Standardization-
Workshop Agreement 15756: “Humani-
tarian Mine Action (HMA) – Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) – Test and 
Evaluation”2
•	 “Ballistic Test Method for Personal Ar-
mour Materials and Combat Clothing”5
•	 “Protocols to Test Upper Body PPE 
Against AP Blast Mines”6
•	 “A Methodology for Evaluating De-
mining Personal Protective Equipment 
for Antipersonnel Landmines”7
Blast Assessment
Extensive research was conducted at 
DRDC Suffield by Ceh, et al., between March 
1999 and November 2000 (published in 20056)
to develop a protocol for testing and evalua-
tion of upper-body AP blast mine personal 
protective equipment. The detailed scientif-
ic and technical review resulted in a com-
prehensive understanding of the physics of a 
mine blast, factors affecting the performance 
of PPE, and the nature and severity of inju-
ries depending on the deminer’s position at 
the time of the blast. From those findings a 
protocol was developed to ensure the rep-
etition of data, good replication of human-
body positioning and motion, representative 
soil characteristics, standardized explosive 
charges and containers, reference pressure 
measurement, and relevant data acquisition 
and processing. 
With regard to the physics of an AP mine 
blast, factors that needed to be controlled in-
cluded the type of explosive used, the charge 
container, depth of charge burial, type of soil, 
distribution of larger soil particles, compac-
tion and moisture content. These parameters 
contributed to the strength and distribution of 
the energy of the blast through the soil matrix 
and expansion of detonation products and soil 
ejecta8 away from the center of the explosion.6 
With regard to the performance of the 
PPE, it was determined that the shape and 
surface area of the PPE affected how the blast 
wave and detonation products propagated 
Figure 2: Trial test site—heated inflatable tent.
around it, thereby affecting how the force was 
transmitted to the person wearing the PPE. 
Brittle materials were found to break into 
fragments that could be propelled at high ve-
locity and cause injury to the person.6 
Since the mid-1990s, anthropomorphic 
mannequins have been used at DRDC Suf-
field for testing of PPE survivability against 
AP mines. The mannequins are chosen to 
match the body size and weight of human 
PPE wearers and allow for instrumented 
gauges to be placed inside for measurement 
of body motion. 
In the 2005 Ceh study,6 the position of the 
deminer in relation to the blast was found to 
greatly influence injury outcome. Humanitar-
ian deminers often preferred a crouched or 
kneeling position to a prone position because 
it improved the field of view, made prodding 
easier and was less fatiguing. However, from 
an injury perspective, deminers in a kneel-
ing position experienced more severe injuries 
from blasts compared to those injured while 
working in a prone position. 
The desire to better control positioning of 
the mannequin during trials led DRDC Suffield 
to develop a testing platform and position-
ing rig. The platform allowed for exact place-
ment of the mannequin a specific distance 
away from the charge, which was buried to a 
measured depth in a known quantity of stan-
dardized soil. Figure 1 on page 71 shows the 
platform and rig placement. The measurement 
fixture and reference pressure transducer can 
be seen to the right of the mannequin.
The Hybrid III anthropomorphic man-
nequin, 5th-percentile female model was used 
for all of the testing as it approximates the size 
of typical Asian deminers more closely than 
the other Hybrid III mannequins at DRDC 
Suffield. The posture chosen for these tests 
Table 1: Visor blast test results.
Table 2: Visor blast testing post-trial photographs.
New Visors Scratched Visors
Scratched and 
Heat-treated Visors
New 6 1B Scratched 1A Scratched, Heat Treated
New 7 2B Scratched 2A Scratched, Heat Treated
3A Scratched, Heat Treated3B ScratchedNew 8
New 9 4B Scratched 4A Scratched, Heat Treated
Visor Description Charge Size Reference Pressure (psi) Visor Outcome
New 1
New 2
New 3 + apron
New 4 + apron
New 5 + apron
Baseline established
200g
100g
100g
150g
100g
at 75g
59.2
32.2
35.3
42.1
36.1
No apron
Broke
Broke
Did not break
Broke
Broke
New 6
New 7
New 8
New 9
75g
75g
75g
75g
34.6
12.9
27.2
30.2
Did not break
Did not break – misfire
Did not break
Did not break
1B scratched
2B scratched
3B scratched
4B scratched
75g
75g
75g
75g
34.9
32.1
28.1
32.7
Broke
Did not break
Did not break
Did not break
1A scratched, heat treated
2A scratched, heat treated
3A scratched, heat treated
4A scratched, heat treated
75g
75g
75g
75g
28.0
26.3
35.6
31.6
Broke
Broke
Broke
Broke
2
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was a kneeling position, with both knees on 
the ground. A wooden rig was used to posi-
tion the hips and knees into the kneeling po-
sition, and the positioning rig was then used 
to adjust the upper body of the mannequin. 
The joints and neck were adjusted to give a 
set stiffness, and were then readjusted be-
tween shots. 
The positioning rig supports the manne-
quin in the desired position before the blast. 
As soon as the blast pushes the mannequin 
backward, the chains go slack and the round 
crossbars fall from their supports, allowing 
free movement of the mannequin during the 
blast event. The measurement fixture is used to 
ensure repeatable placement of various parts 
of the mannequin body at specific X, Y and 
Z distances from ground zero. A reference 
pressure gauge was placed at 90 degrees to 
the charge at the same height and radial dis-
tance from the blast as the mannequin’s visor 
(60 cm). 
The soil type used for testing is medium- 
grain building sand, dried to less than 1% 
moisture, packed loosely in the testing plat-
form, and held in a container within the plat-
form that is large enough to prevent reflected 
shock wave interference from the walls of the 
container, yet small enough in volume to be 
easily removed and replaced between trials 
(60cm x 60cm x 60cm).
The charge containers that were used for this 
study were developed at DRDC Suffield in the 
late 1990s. They are AP mine surrogate contain-
ers made of Dupont Adiprene packed with C4 
plastic explosive, boosted with datasheet and 
center of axis initiated with an RP87 electric 
detonator. The charge size for the blast testing of 
visors in this trial was initially set at 200g C4 to 
match the European Centre for Standardization 
Workshop Agreement requirement of “an ex-
plosive equivalent to (240 ± 1)g cast tri-nitro 
toluene,”2 representing the charge size of the 
PMN mine, which is one of the most frequent-
ly encountered AP blast mines. Initial testing 
demonstrated that the new visors broke at the 
200g charge size. This result necessitated scaling 
back the charge size to 150g then 100g, before a 
threshold of 75g for visor breakage was found. 
In order to provide a suitable location for 
blast testing in temperatures that reach -40 C 
on the Suffield testing site in January, an inflat-
able tent was erected as shown in Figure 2 on 
page 72. A portable heating unit was used to 
provide a constant temperature of 15 C for test-
ing the visors.
The external temperatures in January in 
Suffield, Alberta, Canada, average between -31 
and -10 C and snowfall averages 22cm. In order 
to minimize temperature effects on the poly-
carbonate visors, they were stored in a heated 
building with the temperature maintained be-
tween 15 and 20 C. The visors were then trans-
ported in an insulated container to the heated 
tent and placed on the Hybrid III mannequin. 
The surface temperature was measured using 
an infrared digital temperature-measurement 
device and the trial commenced once the sur-
face temperature reached 15 C. 
Ballistic Assessment
The ballistic assessment was performed 
by an external laboratory, in accordance 
with Standard Agreement 29209 and Inter-
national Mine Action Standard 10.30.10 The 
objective of the V50 ballistic testing was to de-
termine the fragment protection capability of 
the PPE, with V50 representing the velocity at 
which half of the projectiles perforate the tar-
get material. It is noted in IMAS 10.30 that 
the STANAG 2920 test for ballistic protec-
tion may not provide a realistic assessment of 
the fragment threats from mine blasts, but it 
will continue to be used to estimate fragmen-
Description 10N-NEW V50 234m/s
Bullet FSP- 17 Vel. Spread 68m/s
Std Dev 29m/s
Shot Velocity Strike (m/s) Velocity Residual (m/s) Penetration (Y/N) Used in V50 (Y/N)
1 485 Y
2 437 Y
3 255 Y Y
4 261 Y
5 151 0 N Y
6 232 0 N Y
7 262 Y Y
8 206 0 N
9 323 216 Y
10 302 187 Y
11 254 Y Y
12 194 0 N
13 367 Y
14 301 171 Y
15 447 Y
16 249 71 Y Y
17 360 264 Y
18 338 233 Y
Table 3: V50 test results example.
tation protection until another international standard is developed. At 
the time these tests were being prepared, the CEN Workshop Agreement 
was only in a draft form and a formalized version was not available. 
Hence, the V50 testing used the defined 17-grain cold-rolled, annealed-
steel fragment-simulating projectile as a threat (type-1) test for each 
visor tested. As with the blast tests, the ballistic tests were performed 
on the original (new) visors, the scratched visors, and the scratched and 
heat-treated visors.
The V50 testing was conducted using a V50 headform with the visor 
headband aligned along the part line of the headform. A veil witness paper 
was taped to the face of the headform and the fixture was aligned such 
that the FSP struck with zero degrees of strike obliquity to the visor, as 
determined with laser alignment through the bore of the rifle. A laboratory-
grade .22 caliber long-rifle barrel firearm was used to fire the FSP. The 
range for the testing was set at 5.0m and the distance from the exit of the 
rifle muzzle to the strike face was 5.0m. A penetration was positive if it 
resulted in a hole in either the visor or the witness paper. 
Blast Test Results
The visor blast testing took place at DRDC Suffield from 15–22 January 
2008. In total, 18 visors were subjected to blast testing in the enclosed, inflat-
able tent facility illustrated in Figure 2 on page 72. External daytime temper-
atures ranged from a high of -5 C to a low of -23 C, and wind speed ranged 
from 11 to 65 km/h. Despite these extreme weather conditions, the tem-
perature inside the tent was maintained at approximately 15 C with the as-
sistance of two portable, diesel generators, and wind effects were negligible.
Testing began at the CEN Workshop Agreement’s recommended 
charge size of 200g C4 (240g TNT equivalent). After failure of the visor 
at 200g, the charge size was decreased to 100g. In an attempt to achieve 
visor survival at charge sizes closer to the recommended standard, a de-
miner apron was added to the mannequin. However, with breakage of 
the visor at 100g even with the apron, it was decided to proceed without 
an apron and to reduce the charge size to 75g.
Table 1 on page 73 summarizes the results of the visor blast trials. 
Note that visors “New 1” through “New 5” were consumed in attempts to 
Visor Condition V50  (m/s) Std Dev (m/s)
New 234 29
Scratched 226 40
Scratched & Heat Treated 247 18
Table 4: V50 test results summary.
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Vr(m/s)
Vs(m/s)
NEW
SCRATCHED
REPAIRED
Figure 3: Strike velocity (Vs) versus residual velocity (Vr).
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get a charge size at which the new visors would 
survive. The test data in which the three cate-
gories of visor can be compared starts with vi-
sor “New 6.”
Photographs and high-speed video were 
taken of the visor blast trials. The photographs 
in Table 2 (see page 73) show the extent of 
damage to the visors that were broken in the 
trial, as well as the post-blast photos of the vi-
sors that did not break. During the trials, the 
pieces of broken visor were found dispersed 
throughout the tent area and the pieces were 
photographed where they landed. All visor 
pieces were then collected and reconstructed 
for the photographs as illustrated in Table 2 
(see page 73). 
Ballistic Test Results
The results of the ballistic tests were much 
more difficult to interpret. IMAS 10.30 states 
in paragraph 4.3: “PPE provided to reduce 
the risk from such a hazard should include, 
as a minimum … ballistic body armour with 
a STANAG 2920 V50 rating (dry) of 450m/s.” 
It continues, “Eye protection should be no 
less than that offered by 5mm of untreated 
polycarbonate.”10 It does not explicitly state 
that the visor should provide a V50 rating of 
450m/s, nor does it explicitly define what V50 
rating provides an acceptable level of pro-
tection. Indeed, it is possible to use the note 
about 5mm polycarbonate to allow any V50 
rating to be acceptable as long as the visor 
is made of polycarbonate 5mm or thicker. 
This ambiguity makes evaluation of the re-
sults somewhat problematic.
Table 3 (see page 74) shows the V50 test data 
for the new visor. The strike velocity is the ve-
locity at which the projectile struck the face of 
the visor. If the projectile traveled through the 
visor and kept moving, its exit velocity was 
shown as residual velocity. Residual velocity 
was not captured in all cases. To calculate V50 , 
three shots that did not penetrate and three 
shots that did penetrate were selected, while 
attempting to keep the strike velocities reason-
ably similar (the target was within 60m/s). 
This method prevents the far outlying data 
such as shot 1 from influencing the V50 value.
The V50 ballistic tests are summarized in 
Table 4 (see previous page). They show that 
within the error of one standard deviation, all 
three conditions of the visors have effective-
ly the same V50 rating. If anything, the heat 
treatment may have improved the V50 perfor-
mance slightly.
Figure 3 (see previous page) presents the 
results of the ballistic testing in a way that al-
lows comparison of the three conditions. The 
data points along the horizontal axis show the 
shots in which complete penetration did not 
occur (residual velocity is zero), while those 
above the horizontal axis show those that did 
penetrate completely. 
A variety of trend lines can be drawn 
through the three data sets, but they are very 
close to overlapping. With the wide spread 
of velocities and relatively few data points, 
there is really little or no significant differ-
ence among the three curves. In other words, 
these tests suggest that neither the scratching 
nor the heat treatment of the visors degraded 
the new visors from a V50 ballistics standpoint.
Discussion
The results of the blast testing illustrate 
that the threshold for visor breakage for 
scratched, heat-repaired, and even new vi-
sors was far below the recommended charge 
size, when 200g C4 was used. Comparison of 
the results of the blast testing of the scratched 
visors with the scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors, as noted in Table 2 (see page 73), reflects 
more extensive shattering of the heat-treat-
ed visors. The significance of this difference 
would require further testing, especially since 
all three groups of visors were found to break 
at less than half of the specified CEN Work-
shop Agreement charge size.
Observations from field experience sug-
gest that visors subjected to detonations of up 
to 240g TNT do not tend to shatter as they did 
in these tests. Assuming these observations to 
be accurate, it could indicate that there was a 
flaw in the experiment or that the CWA op-
tion to use a substitute for TNT needs to be re-
viewed; either the equivalency criteria need to 
be changed, or perhaps no substitute for TNT 
should be allowed. More experimentation will 
be needed to answer this question.
With regard to the V50 ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was seen that all three groups 
performed comparably. The estimated V50 falls 
between 225 and 250 m/s for all three groups, 
with no statistically significant difference 
among the new visors, scratched visors and 
heat-treated visors. STANAG 2920 is not clear 
with respect to what V50 rating is required for 
visors; it may be 450 m/s or it may simply be 
a 5-mm-thick, untreated polycarbonate visor 
with no requirement for a specific V50 rating. 
Further, if the CEN Workshop Agreement 
(CWA 15756) is taken as “an accepted alterna-
tive ... developed as an international standard” 
(IMAS 10.30, para 4.3.a10), then a less damag-
ing fragment may now be more appropriate for 
future tests of this type. 
Conclusions
Following the blast and ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was determined that: 
•	  Scratching the visors did not appear to 
have any detrimental effects on the blast 
resistance of the visors.
Capt. Charlene Fawcett was with DRDC 
Suffield for approximately three years, during 
which time she worked on various projects 
relating to protection, neutralization and 
detection for both military- and humanitarian-
demining applications. Since writing this 
article, she has retired from 
the Canadian military.
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•	  The proposed heat treatment of the 
scratched visors appears to degrade the 
blast resistance of the visors.
•	  All of the visors, including new ones, 
were broken during blast tests using 
charge sizes half the size recommended 
by the relevant standards.
•	  Neither the scratching nor the heat-
treating process appears to have any det-
rimental effects on the V50 performance 
of the visors under test. The V50 ratings 
for new, scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors fall within the 225–250m/s range.
•	  Contrary to popular opinion, there is 
actually no requirement to have visors 
achieve a V50 rating of 450m/s.
•	  There is a need to investigate whether 
the revised CWA should allow substitu-
tions for TNT, and if so, what equiva-
lency criteria should be applied. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
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5. Whole-of-government approaches refers to public-service agencies working across 
portfolio boundaries and, in this context, typically involves ministries responsible 
for defense, diplomacy and development working closely together.
6. Policy coherence refers to greater coherence in policies across sectors that affect de-
veloping countries (e.g., trade and development).
7. Accra Agenda for Action. Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. 2–4 
September 2008. Accra, Ghana. http://tinyurl.com/n9nefv. Accessed 21 August 2009. 
8. Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. http://tinyurl.com/ltuzc5. 
Accessed 21 August 2009.
9. MAG. “Burundi.” http://tinyurl.com/knz3vl. Accessed 5 October 2009.
10. MAG. “Burundi: Supporting human security.” http://tinyurl.com/dlh9ek. Accessed 
5 October 2009. 
11. MAG. “MAG’s approach to Conventional Weapons Management and Disposal.” 
http://tinyurl.com/ngykpu. Accessed 5 October 2009.
12. Danish Refugee Council and Danish Demining Group. Concept Paper: Community 
Safety in North West Somalia (Somaliland). February 2009. http://tinyurl.com/mstztl. 
Accessed 21 August 2009.
Regional Cooperation: MDD Center for SE Europe, Trlin [ from page 9 ]
1. The Mine Detection Dog Center for South East Europe is mainly designed to train 
mine-detection-dog teams for use in regional mine-action centers and demining 
entities, to support demining efforts in the region with its own MDD teams, and to 
provide expertise and knowledge in area of MDD use. However, MDDC also trains 
other kinds of official dogs, e.g., drug- and explosive-detection dogs, police-patrol 
dogs, search-and-rescue dogs, etc. 
2. Mine Detection Dog Center for South East Europe was established by a Memoran-
dum of Understanding signed by the U.S. Department of State (Office of Humani-
tarian Demining Programs), Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Civil Affairs, and 
the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance on 22 Oc-
tober 2002, and officially opened on 14 October 2003, with initial funds from the 
U.S. Department of State (HDP). Since the start of operation, MDDC has trained 
approximately 150 dogs.
3. “Mine Detection Dogs.” Humanitarian Demining Standard for South East Europe. 
South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council. http://tinyurl.com/lvh4dl. 
Accessed 25 August 2009.
4. Prior to starting a demining task, each demining team, consisting of one dog and 
one handler, must undergo the accreditation process to verify their performance 
and capability. Procedures of accreditation vary from country to country, but are 
basically consistent on testing and issuing periodic accreditations.
USAFRICOM’s Approach to International Stability, Wuestewald [ from page 12]
1. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009, Twelfth Edition. United Nations Mine 
Action Service. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Pg 59–263. 
http://tinyurl.com/kunko6. Accessed 9 October 2009.
2. “U.S. Africa Command.” United States Africa Command. http://tinyurl.com/
l3uaut. Accessed 24 August 2009.
3. E-mail interview with Denise Shorey, Commander, U.S. Navy. U.S. Africa Com-
mand Public Affairs. 10 July 2009.
4.	 “Questions	and	Answers	about	AFRICOM.”	United	States	Africa	Command.	http://
tinyurl.com/me4nw6. Accessed 24 August 2009.
ITF’s Experience with Regional Cooperation, Buhin [ from page 14 ]
1. International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance: Strategy 
2006–2009. International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. 
http://tinyurl.com/yevk5oh. Accessed 8 October 2009.
2. Regional Cooperation in Mine Action: The Case of South-Eastern Europe. Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. November 2005.
3. http://tinyurl.com/ylotdp7. Accessed 23 September 2009.
4. Beber Boštjančič, Sabina (ITF). “Regional Approach to Mine Action—Experiences 
and Prospects on the Meeting of the Mine Action Support Group.” PowerPoint pre-
sentation. 27 March 2009. 
5. ITF Annual Reports in period 1999–2009. http://tinyurl.com/laj2nk. Accessed 8 
October 2009.
6. South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council. http://tinyurl.com/
ywocqt. Accessed 9 September 2009.
7. Hočevar, Iztok (ITF). “ITF Regional Approach to Mine Action in Central Asia.” 
PowerPoint presentation. 7–8 July 2009.
8. Conversion as of 9 September 2009.
In Remembrance: Felisberto Novele [ from page 17 ] 
1. Evripidou, Stefanos. “UN solider killed in demining accident.” The Free Library. 
http://tinyurl.com/ye77kr8. Accessed 5 November 2009. 
2. “Cyprus.” Electronic Mine Information Network. http://tinyurl.com/yc85wfb. Ac-
cessed 5 November 2009.
3. Kreouzos, Netha. “De-miners – Clearing a path for peace.” The Blue Beret. June/July 
2008. http://tinyurl.com/yl9u9yd. Accessed 5 November 2009. 
UNMAS’s Rapid-response Exercise by Holm, Kuklick and McCoull [ from page 18 ] 
1. Because the exercise is a compressed version of what a possible real scenario would 
be, one “practice day” is one day’s time in the framework of the exercise, but less 
than one day in actual time.
2. The Protection Cluster is a forum for agencies involved in a specific crisis/emergency 
where interventions can be targeted and priorities from different agencies can be dis-
cussed and coordinated. http://tinyurl.com/ycf8e3v. Accessed 12 November 2009.
3. Interview with Maxwell Kerley on the Rapid Response Exercise by the UN TV. 
4. E-mail interview with Angel Belen, Deputy Director, Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, U.S. Department of Defense. 18 August 2009.
Change is the Only Constant, Gegic [ from page 22  ]
1. Alvin Toff ler’s famous comment originating from a quote by Heraclitus, Greek 
philosopher, 500 B.C.
2. On 18 April 2008, the FSD program in Burundi ceased its field activities due to an 
escalation in armed conflict between government forces and Forces Nationales de 
Libération (the last remaining armed group in Burundi, better known by its acro-
nym FNL). The field activities were on stand down for nearly two months.
3. A drastic example is an attack launched by the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugan-
dan rebellion group on the FSD convoy in South Sudan in November 2005 in which 
one international and one national FSD staff member were killed. FSD had no other 
options but to terminate the program due to complete paralysis and powerlessness 
from both United Nations and national authorities to cope with the problem.
4. On 12 March 2008, the FSD mine-clearance team was ambushed by armed ban-
dits while returning from a task in Bururi province, Burundi (the convoy was 
under police escort). As result of the attack, one deminer sustained a minor 
head injury and two vehicles were severely damaged. It was pure luck that more 
serious injuries or deaths were avoided. The remaining tasks in the area were 
suspended and FSD continued working only in areas in close vicinity of main 
and well-guarded roads. This caused yet another change in deployment and op-
erational planning.
Sri Lanka: Mine Action in a Deteriorating Environment, Rush [ from page 24 ]
1. “Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Re-
public of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” http://tinyurl.com/
lhhnvkl. Accessed 8 July 2009.
2. Muggah, Robert. Relocation Failures in Sri Lanka—A Short History of Internal Dis-
placement and Resettlement. Zed Book: 147. 
3. “Sri Lanka.”Landmine Monitor Report 2002. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/l3wb9q. Accessed 26 June 2009. 
4. “Sri Lanka.”Landmine Monitor Report 2004. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/mjj7jg. Accessed 26 June 2009. 
5. “Sri Lanka.” Landmine Monitor Report 2003. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/lckjcz. Accessed 26 June 2009.
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